CONFLICT AND PEACE IN CASAMANCE

Voices of Senegalese, Gambian and Bissau-Guinean citizens
This document was written by Mame-Penda Ba and Rachid Id Yassine.

This document is part of a series of texts intended to contribute to reflections and actions in favor of the resolution of the conflict in Casamance and more broadly of all those which take place on the African continent.

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The document and its executive summary are available on the website www.casamance-conflict.com or on www.laspad.org in their French version but also translated into English by Mamadou Ba.

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GENERAL INTRODUCTION

Many things are surprising when studying the conflict in Casamance.

One could place a first tension in the long existence of the separatist movement that appeared publicly in 1982 and the vigorous resistance of a collective imagination that persists in thinking of Senegal as a land of peace (dëku jam), on which blood does not flow (deret du fi turu). There is a denial of reality reinforced by the ignorance and isolation from the field of violence. What is out of the sensitive experience also seems to out of reality here.

The conflict in Casamance also appears to be an unmanageable conflict because it is polycentric and multipolar. Indeed, if in its beginnings the MFDC\(^1\) claimed its withdrawal from the Senegalese entity through a guerrilla, the situation quickly became more complex following a disconnection between the political wing (internal and external) and the military one (North, South, and West fronts) and above all an entrenchment of internal splits in the movement which, on top of the war against the State, have added more devastating fratricidal conflicts\(^2\). This factor makes its resolution much more uncertain.

Located in Senegal, the conflict is no less Senegambian, and this entanglement of the local in the global, facilitated by the cultural continuum, is manifested in particular by the transnational mobility of combatants, their ability to seek political, economic, and military resources – including those related to crime – in The Gambia, Guinea-Bissau and the diaspora, and finally in the migration of issues in these countries. This is probably one of the explanations for the exceptional resilience of the maquis in Casamance. In Dakar, the Senegambian policy can be deciphered through the grammar of securing a vital space in which the interference of a pro-MDFC government must be ruled out.

These factors partly explain the recurrent routs of all “peacemakers”, local or international, secular or religious. Making peace in Casamance looks like an eternal restarting: Cacheu 1991, Banjul 1999-2001, and Foundiougne 2005 have not been more successful and the range of traditional and modern modes of resolution has been exhausted in a quest (impossible?) for sustainable peace. Such a situation questions not only the real obstacles to peace, but also and particularly the nature of the conflict and the types of radicalities at work there.

The conflict in Casamance is not only unmanageable, but also "unthinkable" – at least by Senegalese intellectuals: in the small epistemic community of "casamancists"\(^3\), only 25.6% of the scientific production is Senegalese and with 2.3% more from other African countries, 27.9% of scientific literature on the subject is produced in Africa. This Senegalese quarter represents about seventy researchers for a community of 740 Teachers-Researchers in Social Science\(^4\), less than 10% of whom use the conflict as an object of study. The rest of the

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\(^1\) Name given by Mamadou Nkrumah Sané and Abbot Diaramouene to the social protest movement in 1982. This name is borrowed from the first Movement of the Democratic Forces of Casamance, a regionalist political party created in 1947 and which, in fact, is dissolved by association with the BDS of Senghor in 1956. The separatists build a continuity between these two MFDCs when researchers see these two organizations as a radical difference. See Manga, Foucher (121-122), Marut, Capain Bassene (2014: 25) for example.

\(^2\) Today there are two major Cassolol fronts in the south, on the Guinean border and the northern front held by Salif Sadio. Other warlords: Kompass Diatta, Cesar Atoute Badiate, Fatoma Coly.

\(^3\) Vincent Foucher, in his thesis, talks about “low-intensity academic conflict,” p. 17.

production is mainly European (with French domination 34.7% and 13.7% for the other European countries; United States and Canada 8.4%)\(^5\). How can we explain that between 1982 and 2019 we end up with 112 scientific publications from Senegal, that an average of three publications per year?

But among all these reasons of astonishment is the silence of those for whom one fights on both sides. Whether it is the "People of Casamance" in whose name the MFDC calls for independence or the "Senegalese Nation" whose preservation justifies, according to the State, the repression of Atika\(^6\), here we have a "silent centre, or silenced" (Spivak, 2009: 43). What are the perceptions of this "silent centre" – but still affected, concerned, involved, indifferent or embarrassed by the conflict in Casamance? Few studies have asked and attempted to answer this question. The consistent scientific works dealing with the conflict and which seeks to give voice to different actors mostly limit themselves to qualitative techniques (interviews, observations, ethnography, consultation of documentation sources, sometimes archives of statistical data). The "casamancists" have met with tens or even hundreds of people over many years in order to triangulate their data. On the other hand, there is no quantitative, \textit{a fortiori} tri-national survey about the conflict.

Almost four decades after that famous 26 December 1982 from which history rushes, our ambition was therefore to give voice to a thousand and a half men and women, Senegalese but also Gambian and Bissau-Guinean in order to understand their subjectivities and experiences relating to the conflict and the peace process in Casamance. Without reifying our sample as "people or nation", but giving it only quality to draw heavy trends, significant recurrences or conversely dissonances that may be questionable, we set out to measure the levels of knowledge of respondents, to understand the meaning they give to what has happened and is currently happening, to its moral economy, that is, how the conflict has been managed politically and militarily since 1982. If, with Gayatri Spivak, we consider that "doing something, working for the subordinate, it means bringing it into the discourse" (2009: 107), then we must at the same time assume that what the "silent centre" can say about the conflict and the sortie from the violence is fundamental. The aim of this survey is thus to "bring into the discourse" that is to say on the public stage – because the discourse is, so to speak, the place of appearance of the citizen – the men and women who share the conflict.

From this point of view, which is the point of view of ordinary citizens, what is called a "low-intensity conflict" (Evans, 2003) in the context of a scientific typology of conflicts, is a matter of the life of the beings who are thrown there by the chance of history and geography, of the order of the disaster. It takes shape here through a whirlwind of dead and wounded\(^7\), terror, rape, fear of talking, fear, humiliation, displaced and refugees\(^8\), mined villages, disabled people, mental disorders and traumas, destruction of the trust and social ties, loss of land, altars, impoverishment, misery and dependence, denunciation, revenge, resentment and anger, helplessness, moral suffering, unhappiness. Those living outside the epicentre of the conflict\(^9\) are nonetheless concerned because they have had to welcome relatives and friends subjected to displacement and abuse. Finally, most people know about the conflict only what

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\(^{5}\) These data are derived from the statistics of the literature census on the conflict carried by the LASPAD (www.casamance-conflict.com).

\(^{6}\) The fighter in Jola, and name given to the armed wing of the MFDC created in 1984 by Sidy Badji.

\(^{7}\) Estimates in 2010 gave about 5,000 dead and 10,000 injured (Marut: 2010: 26).

\(^{8}\) Evans and Ray, 2013, quoted by Diallo 2015:60 estimated the displaced between 24,000 and 40,000 and refugees in Gambia and Guinea-Bissau to tens of thousands.

\(^{9}\) The regions of Ziguinchor and Sedhiou
they hear through the media and the few expert debates, in the aftermath of violent episodes. At home, he arouses exasperation or indifference, vows of termination, oblivion, until the next outpouring.

Nevertheless, it must be acknowledged that talking about the disaster is particularly difficult for many reasons, including at least two that will be emphasized.

The first is that there is a monopoly in the production of hegemonic narratives about the conflict that can be found on three levels: that of the State, that of the rebellion, and that of the peacemakers (civil society). The discourse of the nationalist state elites faces its double, that of nationalist separatist elites. The first is part of the paradigm of the preservation of a unitary State merging with an indivisible Nation, a political and mental construction inherited from French colonization. The guardians of the State, that is, the guardians of the territorial integrity and the nation, can only consider the will of the State to withdraw as an attempt to break up the One and to disperse the Whole. Such a claim that raises the essential question of the maintenance and preservation of the State becomes the only "total political crime" and, therefore, unforgivable; there can be no negotiations when the issue is the question of the "life" of the State.

On the other hand, the narrative of the separatists takes the form of an accusation of fraud, of a rejection of radical difference, and a scandalous economic abandonment. For the nationalists in Casamance, the state of Senegal is a fiction: Casamance has never been a part of it like the rest. On the contrary, everything incorporates it into The Gambia and Guinea-Bissau, and nothing to Senegal except a limited-term contract, a federative pact. After the end of the event in 1980, Casamance had to regain its sovereignty. The argument here centres around the instrumentalization of the elites of the MFDC of 1947 by the BDS of Senghor and the perseverance in the duplicity, manipulation and falsification of historical facts – for the exploitation of the "attic of Casamance" and political and cultural domination – of the post-Senghorian State. Based on the right of peoples to self-determination, the MFDC is therefore tasked with waging a war of liberation against the "Senegalese colonization".

In this clash of two radicalisms, the voice of civil society organizations (secular and religious, national and international) is the voice of the middle ground, of the call for ceasefire, for dialogue and lasting peace.

Second, what is often at stake in speaking out is nothing more or less than freedom or life. Indeed, the combination of state censorship, the outrageous mobilization of the judiciary (particularly under Diouf and Wade) and the intelligence services and the self-censorship of individuals because of the facts of denunciation and sometimes their deadly consequences,
has early and strongly forced free speech, turning the conflict into a taboo. Even today, the silences on the discourse about the conflict have not yet been fully lifted\(^\text{12}\).

**SURVEY METHODOLOGY: TERRITORIALIZING KNOWLEDGE, ATTITUDES AND PRACTICES ABOUT THE CONFLICT**

The survey is part of an inductive approach through a perceptions study conducted in three countries divided into eight localities and twenty-four neighbourhoods. The choice of these localities was based on methodological and practical reasons. Indeed, the capitals of the three countries had to be investigated for reasons of representation and comparison, and then be associated with a second area sufficiently remote and populated. We selected for Senegal, Dakar in the west, and Ziguinchor in the south, then Banjul and Bwiam in central Gambia, and Bissau and Farim for Guinea-Bissau. However, the population size of Senegal (15.9 million inhabitants) almost eight times larger than that of The Gambia (2.1 million) or Guinea-Bissau (1.9 million), have urged us to double the number of localities in Senegal by favouring the North and South-east by adding respectively Saint-Louis and Tambacounda.

![Map 1. Location map of the municipalities of the survey](image)

The study scheme sought to territorialize knowledge, attitudes (perceptions, beliefs, representations) and practices (actual acts carried out by the person in a situation) by measuring them and then mapping and analysing them at the municipal, national, and regional levels to allow crossbreeding and comparisons. Based on the available administrative redistricting, the means of the study allowed us to select three neighbourhood per locality.

The survey is based on a questionnaire\(^\text{13}\) that was submitted in direct administration to the people we met in the different neighbourhoods. Five teams of three investigators were trained, each supervised by a team leader who is an experienced sociologist. Investigators interviewed 1,665 people between 03 and 19 March 2019, and finally 1,480 were validated and consolidated.

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\(^{12}\) Reports from investigators in all visiting locations indicate this discomfort and a recurring refusal to speak. The motives are many: suspicions of being agents of the State, fear of reprisals...

\(^{13}\) See Appendix 1.
The first challenge was to administer a questionnaire of about 60 questions, to a population sometimes reluctant\textsuperscript{14}. With 160 more men than women, the representation rate of men is 54.7% compared to 45.3% of women. This gap stems from the fact that the women have often been reluctant to answer the questionnaire. Investigators have been repeatedly refused by those women without explanation.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COUNTRY</th>
<th>RESPONDENTS</th>
<th>CITIES</th>
<th>RESPONDENTS</th>
<th>NEIGHBOURHOODS</th>
<th>RESPONDENTS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>856</td>
<td>Dakar</td>
<td>267</td>
<td>Plateau</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Bissuiterie</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Fass - GT - Colobane</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Saint-Louis</td>
<td>285</td>
<td>HLM</td>
<td>107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Leona</td>
<td>103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Pikine</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Ziguinchor</td>
<td>158</td>
<td>Escale</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Boucote</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Lyndiane</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Tambacounda</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>Liberté</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Dépôt</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>SaréGuillèle</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Gambia       | 305         | Banjul-SerreKunda | 150     | Banjul         | 50          |
|              |             |                |          | ManjaiKunda    | 50          |
|              |             |                |          | Bundung        | 50          |
|              |             | Bwiam          | 155       | Bwiam          | 51          |
|              |             |                |          | Kankuntu       | 48          |
|              |             |                |          | Sibanor        | 56          |

| Guinea-Bissau| 319         | Bissau         | 154       | Praça          | 49          |
|              |             |                |          | Bairromilitar  | 57          |
|              |             |                |          | Sintra         | 48          |
|              |             | Farim          | 165       | Praça          | 57          |
|              |             |                |          | Nema           | 47          |
|              |             |                |          | Morkunda       | 61          |

Table 1. Distribution of the number of respondents by area

\textsuperscript{14} See Field Reports.
On the other hand, the age distribution is satisfactorily balanced, with 35.7% of young people under 30, then 37.7% of respondents aged between 30 and 49, and 26.6% aged 50 and over.

The second major challenge was the management of translation, requiring not only the recruitment of polyglot investigators, but also the translation of the questionnaire from French (11%), English (4.1%) or Portuguese (1%) to different local languages. The task was mainly carried out in local languages (84.8%).

The religious identity of respondents is predominantly Muslim (84.1%) and a substantial proportion of Christians (14.3%).
18% of respondents have a primary education level, and 17% have only had a Koranic education, 25% have a secondary level, 14% have obtained their high school diploma (or equivalent). Respondents with a university level represent 15% and are distributed as follows: 2% of master degree, 5% of bachelor degree, and 8% for first and second years.

The self-employed (32%) are the most represented socio-professional categories. In this category, there is a significant proportion of informal enterprises linked to distribution, textiles, and catering. Public and private employees make up 18% of the population, students 14.5%, and the unemployed 10%.
Chart 5. Distribution of respondents by work situation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>French</th>
<th>English</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Retraité</td>
<td>Retired</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chef d'entreprise</td>
<td>Company Director</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libéral ou travailleur indépendant</td>
<td>Self-employed</td>
<td>475</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fonctionnaire ou employé public</td>
<td>Civil servant or public employee</td>
<td>134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salaried ou employé du secteur privé</td>
<td>Paid or private employee</td>
<td>132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inactif ou chômeur</td>
<td>Inactive or unemployed</td>
<td>151</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elève ou étudiant non boursier</td>
<td>Pupil or student with no scholarship</td>
<td>215</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Autre</td>
<td>Other</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Chart 6. Distribution of respondents by main industry

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>French</th>
<th>English</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Autre</td>
<td>Other</td>
<td>208</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bâtiment et assimilé</td>
<td>Building and affiliated</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sécurité</td>
<td>Security</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education et assimilé</td>
<td>Education and affiliated</td>
<td>202</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Santé, médecine et pharmacie</td>
<td>Health, medicine and pharmacy</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Textile et chaussure</td>
<td>Textile and shoes</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commerce, négoce, distribution</td>
<td>Commerce, trade and distribution</td>
<td>278</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture, élevage et assimilé</td>
<td>Agriculture, breeding and affiliated</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Restauration et assimilé</td>
<td>Catering and affiliated</td>
<td>128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ne répond pas</td>
<td>No answer</td>
<td>118</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
OUTLINE OF THE ARTICLE

The results of the survey are presented in seven sections. A first section describes the model of analysis that allows us to interpret the data and go beyond a purely descriptive approach. This model crosses three key categories (generation, gender, and position). From there, we compare the knowledge levels and attitudes to the conflict (Sections 2, 3).

In Sections 4 and 5, perceptions and representations of the institutions that are on the front line when this conflict emerges are measured and analysed: the State, its army, the separatist movement, and the civil society. We also study other actors involved, including the neighbouring states and a few Western countries (France, USA).

Sections 6 and 7 address the perceptions related to the obstacle to peace and ways out of the conflict.
SECTION 1.

MODELLING THE KNOWLEDGE, ATTITUDES AND PRACTICES IN FRONT OF THE CONFLICT

In order to avoid freezing the respondents into monolithic and anonymous groups, and to be able to understand the origins of the variations in their discourse, a first challenge was necessary: that of knowing who speaks? Where is he/she talking from? What experience is he/she talking about? The answer to these preliminary questions allows us to "situate" our interlocutors in time, space and in their experiences as men or women.

These "social coordinates" allow us to identify three simple but relevant categories whose triangulation allows us to account for the existence of concordances or heterogeneities in speeches. This is the generation (the fact that different ages normally correspond to different experiences and memories), the position (the assumption that the spaces from which the conflict is experienced play an important role in its knowledge and perceptions), and gender (the idea that the experience of the conflict is always a sexual experience and, therefore, this difference informs the knowledge, attitudes, and practices of the respondents).

Our comprehensive approach to the discourses ensures that these axes are not partitioned or prioritized, but instead it aims to build an integrated approach that allows us to account for the interaction of these different registers. Examining the results of the tri-national survey thus allows us to sketch an analytical framework that simultaneously takes into account the variables of ages, spaces, and genders.

THE THREE GENERATIONS AND THEIR MEMORIES

We start from the assumption that knowledge, attitudes, and practices in the face of the conflict are part of the type of experience and specific memory shared by those who live at the same time and who are about the same age, i.e. those of the same generation. The generation as we understand it here is the coincidence between an age class and an event that served as a reference for the knowledge/acknowledgement of the memory of it. For Nora, "generation is the product of remembrance, a remembrance effect" of events (1997: 2999). With nearly four decades of existence, the conflict has indeed entered the memories in different ways.

Thus, we can distinguish three different generations.

The first generation born before 1970 is now 50 years of age and older. They knew Casamance before the conflict, some even under French colonization. Its founding event is based on a year (December 1982, December 1983) of a succession of generating events of the maquis (repressed march of 1982, the trial of the ideologues of independence (from 05 to 13 December 1983), the assassination of the gendarmes in Diabir on 6 December, and especially...
the Ziguinchor attack on 18 December 1983). The youngest of this generation, who were at least 14 years old in December 1982, were already old enough to understand the extreme gravity of what was happening. They would live their entire adult lives under the conflict. The adults, on the other hand, had suffered enough frustrations to at least stand in solidarity with the social protest, without going so far as to approve the idea of separating from the rest of Senegal. This generation has seen the conflict unfold before their eyes since its earliest days.

Outside Casamance, this first generation witnessed the stalemate and transformation of the conflict. This generation makes up 26.62% of our sample.

The second generation (1970-1989) is the one that is now between 30 and 49 years old and at most 13 years old when the conflict emerges. It grew up with the conflict, part of it was born right after the conflict was triggered. Essentially too young to understand in the early years what was happening, the major turning point is mainly marked by the year 1990-91 and the "military professionalization" of the rebels who became better armed and benefiting from new recruits. Atika is waging a real guerrilla war against the defence and security forces in Casamance as shown by the violence and regularity of the confrontations. Dakar, for its part, increased military pressure, and appointed a general as governor of the Ziguinchor region in 1990. Outside of Casamance, thanks to the emerging media pluralism, the stigmatizing word "rebel" and its ethnic reduction to the Jóolas, spreads almost everywhere in the press and this unique thought of the irreducible difference of this region and its inhabitants, becomes the main prism from which the conflict is thought. This second generation represents 37.71% of our sample.

The third generation (1990-2001), is the one that is now between 18 and 29 years old. Born after 1990, the striking event of their generation was the alternation in 2000 with the arrival of Abdoulaye Wade to power and the display of an ultra-voluntarist goal of building peace in 100 days. The peace-building process is organized around traditional mechanisms, which are supposed to be more adapted and effective, giving a decisive role to women and culture. This generation represents 35.68% of the sample.

The geographic position or exposition towards the conflict

The generation is therefore the starting point but, the men and women who form each generation are located in specific spaces that constitute their position. This position is considered in relation to a reference space that is the space for the deployment of the conflict: Lower Casamance. Being close or far from this space, from the places where things happen, is not neutral. Being in Ziguinchor, Bignona, Banjul, Thiès, Saint-Louis or Paris when the attacks and multifaceted violence occur, generates very different experiences due in the first place to the exposure to the conflict.
However, the obvious facts may be misleading and simplistic in this case. The geographical proximity does not necessarily mean a higher level of concern – this is indeed the case when one is directly exposed – but different, which can range from the utmost attention to total indifference: a man from Casamance in Lisbon or Berlin, whose village is under fire and a man from Saint-Louis who has no interest in this issue, obviously do not have the same kind of relationship to the event. Therefore, the geographical position is both physical and relational. If we are therefore interested in geographical location, it is to check the consequences of exposure in terms of knowledge, attitudes, and practices. Moreover, within the same generation and between generations, it will be possible to compare the responses relating to space.

We distinguish two main areas:

1. The southern zone, namely the southern Senegambia, which can still be divided into two spaces: the epicentre of the conflict, namely Lower Casamance (here represented by Ziguinchor) and its immediate periphery (which includes southern Gambia and northern Guinea-Bissau, known as "other Souths"). This overall South represents just under 53% of the sample (782 people).

2. The North-East area represented by Dakar, Saint-Louis, and Tambacounda. Here too, this strip can be divided into two main spaces: North (Dakar and Saint-Louis) and East (Tambacounda). The Northeast area represents just over 47% of the sample (698 people).

The distribution of the respondents by large areas and the numbers divided by generation and zone shows a relative balance.
GENDER AND THE CONFLICT

The knowledge, attitudes, and practices of men and women are not only evident in their generation or position, but also in their socialization and the expectations that their communities of belonging and society assign to them from their biological gender. Their answers are gendered in the sense that being a man or a woman exposes you to social experiences that can be (often) radically different. This is the case with speaking on public and political matters and in particular on an ongoing conflict. The kind of legitimacy and competence that allows you to opine on this kind of subject is very socially framed. The investigators’ reports all referred to the reluctance, distrust, and refusal among women towards the questionnaire.

The following excerpts from investigators are edifying:

"Like all fields, this one is not exempt from difficulties. [...] I thought it was a foregone conclusion, I was very surprised by the attitudes of women
especially, because I thought that these words: "Go see the men" or "Excuse me but I cannot comment on these questions", or "Boys or the chief are there, go and talk to them" were the "villagers" were frequent among the "villagers", I am now confronted with this, in the middle of the Senegalese capital" (investigator in Dakar, district of Biscuiterie).

"Women almost systematically refuse to participate either for unavailability (because they work all day long) or for fear" (investigator in Dakar, districts of Fass, Geule Tapée, Colobane).

"And when I entered the houses, the women sent me back to the fathers of the family" (investigator in Saint-Louis, district of Pikine).

Gender is therefore an important variable to be taken care of, including measuring and interpreting this position of women.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>NORTHEAST</th>
<th>SOUTH</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1st G</td>
<td>2nd G</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WOMEN</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEN</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>170</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3. Distribution of respondents by gender, region, and generation

Chart 10. Distribution of respondents by gender and regions studied
SECTION 2.

THE CONFLICT KNOWLEDGE:
GEOGRAPHIES OF IGNORANCE AND SILENCE

The issues related to the knowledge of the conflict were quite basic. They were related to the year of its break-up, the meaning of the acronym MFDC, the causes, the leaders, and the demands of the rebel movement, and the existence or not of peace agreements. For all these questions, there is a fairly widespread lack of awareness: 85% of respondents do not know the exact date of the beginning of the conflict. 65% of respondents cannot say exactly what the acronym MFDC means; almost 48% do not know exactly who the MFDC opposes. 30% do not know the main causes of the rebellion, 35% do not know any leader of the rebellion, and 21% have no idea of the main claim of the movement. 60% of respondents are unaware of the existence of peace agreements, more than 65% are not aware of any civil society organization working for the return of peace in Casamance. For all the questions that require precise knowledge, the first answer, the most important numerically, is always that of those who do not know: the average percentage of "I don't know" (dnk) is 51%. When we add those who do not pronounce, that is, the non-answers (na), it increases to 60%.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Do not know (dnk)</th>
<th>No answer (na)</th>
<th>Other answers</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>% dnk</th>
<th>% na</th>
<th>Combined dnk and na</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>North-East</td>
<td>2223</td>
<td>625</td>
<td>1340</td>
<td>4188</td>
<td>53,08%</td>
<td>14,92%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South</td>
<td>2677</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>1879</td>
<td>4692</td>
<td>57,05%</td>
<td>2,90%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>4900</td>
<td>761</td>
<td>3219</td>
<td>8880</td>
<td>55,18%</td>
<td>8,57%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4. Distribution of types of responses on the knowledge of the conflict by area

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Do not know (dnk)</th>
<th>No answer (na)</th>
<th>Other answers</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>% dnk</th>
<th>% na</th>
<th>% Combined dnk and na</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ziguinchor</td>
<td>193</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>734</td>
<td>948</td>
<td>20,35%</td>
<td>2,21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Souths</td>
<td>2484</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>1145</td>
<td>3744</td>
<td>66,34%</td>
<td>3,30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2677</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>1879</td>
<td>4692</td>
<td>57,00%</td>
<td>2,89%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5. Distribution of types of responses on the knowledge of the conflict in the South

How does it come that a conflict that has been active for almost forty years in a small country like Senegal is so largely unknown? What can this widespread ignorance be associated with, except for the city of Ziguinchor alone?

To the level of education? No, because the number of respondents in Dakar and Saint-Louis at the same time have a much higher level of school education (Bac and more) than Ziguinchor, except for Ziguinchor.
and a level of ignorance almost three times higher. Similarly, the numbers surveyed in Tambacounda have a strictly identical level of education as Ziguinchor, but Tambacounda has the lowest scores in terms of knowledge. There is no association between the knowledge of the conflict and the level of education. One explanation is that the history of the conflict is taught neither in primary school, nor in secondary school and in the university, what is not only surprising, but also disturbing. Those who know something about the conflict know this from sources other than formal education, whether public or private.

Table 6. Distribution of respondents by locality and level of study

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Locality</th>
<th>% Bac and higher</th>
<th>% inferior to Bac</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dakar and Saint-Louis</td>
<td>27,17%</td>
<td>72,46%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tambacounda</td>
<td>17,12%</td>
<td>82,87%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ziguinchor</td>
<td>17,72%</td>
<td>81,64%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is therefore questionable whether the socio-professional category can explain the levels of knowledge of the conflict? Again, there seems to be no association between the two variables. If we limit ourselves to the five socio-professional categories that comprise 83% of the total numbers, Ziguinchor has as many students as the North or the East, more unemployed, fewer private employees, but more civil servants than Dakar and Saint-Louis. The city has a socio-economic profile quite close to that of Tambacounda (as many private employees, civil servants, but less self-employed). These are all fluctuations that go one way or the other that do not explain the significant differences with the North or the East, very different in terms of CSP mobilized, but who have very high levels of ignorance. Again, it can be remembered that having a job or not does not seem to provide more resources for a better understanding of the conflict.

Table 7. Distribution of respondents by locality and occupational category

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Locality</th>
<th>Pupil or student</th>
<th>Inactive or unemployed</th>
<th>Private employee</th>
<th>Civil servant</th>
<th>Independent worker</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>North</td>
<td>13,4%</td>
<td>5,9%</td>
<td>13,22%</td>
<td>3,26%</td>
<td>48,73%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East</td>
<td>15,75%</td>
<td>10,9%</td>
<td>5,47%</td>
<td>9,58%</td>
<td>42,46%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ziguinchor</td>
<td>13,29%</td>
<td>16,45%</td>
<td>5,69%</td>
<td>8,86%</td>
<td>34,17%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Although the variables education and CSP are not illuminating, it appears, however, that the mobilization of the three combined variables sheds more light on this enigma: the map of this ignorance follows massively a North-East axis, it is more marked within the third generation and among the women's group. Exposure to conflict appears to be decisive in the knowledge and attitudes of respondents. The people of Ziguinchor, the city that was its epicentre, are the most learned about the conflict: memory does not leave the place, even when the chains of transmission are frozen by the omerta, even when there is little or no public space to debate

17 In classes about the conflicts, however, some teachers sometimes talk about the conflict in Casamance.

18 The centrality of Ziguinchor in the conflict: the capital of Lower Casamance, was the place where the repressed march of 26 December 1982 was held. The Diabir forest on its periphery hosted the preparatory meetings for the march. It was there that the three gendarmes were killed on December 6, 1983. And the first attack by the separatists, that of December 18, 1983, took place in Ziguinchor.
freely about the conflict. While the Northeast is at a rate of ignorance of 53%, the rate drops to 20% in Ziguinchor. When those who do not express an opinion peak at 15% in Dakar, Saint-Louis and Tambacounda, we are at 2% in the capital of the South.

Thus, the knowledge is always more important in the South – an area in which more than half of the exact answers are found – than in other regions. On the other hand, regardless of the locality to which it is compared, the epicentre of the conflict has the highest rates with the knowledge of the conflict as well as the lowest rates of ignorance and silence.

Map 3. Distribution of responses to the meaning of the acronym MFDC by region

Chart 11. Distribution of responses about the year the conflict began by region
It is in the South that people know more about the leaders of the MFDC, both the most famous (Salif Sadio) and the oldest (Abbot Diamacoune). But more significantly, when names require a better knowledge of the conflict, the over-representation of the South is glaring: this is where people know more Nkrumah Sané, Ousmane Tamba, JMF Biagui, Ama Diémé.

This series of tables is particularly interesting because it shows that Ziguinchor has the highest number of correct responses compared to the other cities surveyed, and the lowest number of erroneous and admission of ignorance.

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19 Ousmane Tamba was one of the organizers and participants in the Ziguinchor attack on December 18, 1983. He was sentenced to five years, partly in the same cell as César Atoute Badiate and then with Abbot Diamacoune. Ousmane Tamba currently lives in Switzerland where he founded a section of the MFDC.
Chart 14. Responses to the question about the year of the beginning of the conflict by region (bis: Ziguinchor)

A comparison between Ziguinchor and Tambacounda, whose samples are of similar size (158 and 146), shows that Ziguinchor has 3 times more accurate responses and 2.5 times less "I don't know".

In what year did the conflict begin in Casamance?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Correct answer</th>
<th>Rough answer</th>
<th>Wrong answer</th>
<th>Do not know</th>
<th>No answer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ziguinchor</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tambacounda</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 8. Answers of Ziguinchor and Tambacounda to the question about the beginning year of the conflict

Moreover, the strictly accurate answers about the beginning year of the conflict are always the most numerous for the first two generations; exact knowledge decreases from the second generation.

Chart 15. Breakdown of responses from the year conflict began by generation
The first two generations know more about the less media leaders of the conflict such as Mamadou Nkrumah Sané or Ousmane Tamba or the former leaders who disappeared like Abbot Diamacoune, personalities almost unknown among the youngest. The third generation has 2.5 times higher dk rates than the first generation. It is this third generation that, at more than 45%, has appointed Robert Sagna as the fourth most well-known personality of the MFDC ahead of Nkrumah Sané. It is among the youngest that the instructive confusions between mediators and independence leaders are strongest: the Robert Sagna case is exemplary because despite his longevity in the State of Senegal, he was Minister, Mayor of Ziguinchor, coordinator of the Reflection Group for Peace in Casamance (GRPC), he is recognized as one of Atika's leaders.

Finally, this knowledge is always more pronounced among men than among women, and more so in women in Ziguinchor compared to other women. Whatever the question, men give more accurate and approximate answers. Women are over-represented in ignorance and silence. But they are mostly women from the North-East. Women in Ziguinchor tend to respond more.
Whatever the question asked, the women in Ziguinchor give more accurate answers than those in Dakar, Saint-Louis or Tambacounda. A comparison of the women in Ziguinchor, in the North, and in Tambacounda for the question "against whom the MFDC opposes?" reveals that the women in Ziguinchor are 64% correct compared to 31% for those in Dakar and Saint-Louis, and 19% for those in Tambacounda. Conversely, confessions of ignorance and non-response are significantly higher among women in the North and East. While the groups are comparable in size between Ziguinchor and Tambacounda, their responses are second to none.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Women from:</th>
<th>Correct answer</th>
<th>Rough answer</th>
<th>Wrong answer</th>
<th>Do not know</th>
<th>No answer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ziguinchor</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tambacounda</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>227</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 9, Distribution of women by locality: Against whom the MFDC opposes?

One could tentatively conclude this section by remembering that the separatism in Casamance is a largely unknown conflict as soon as one leaves the region concerned. The risk factors that increase this ignorance are gender (women know less than men) and age (the 3rd generation knows less than the first two).

37 years after its occurrence, the conflict in Casamance has not entirely become a national issue, its democratization is still unfinished even though its publicization and radical takeover by civil society would allow us to confront the real questions it raises: its origins, the infrastructure capacities of the State, the centre-periphery relations, the model of national construction, etc.

It is probably here, in this collective avoidance of the conflict, totally delegated without any control or sanction to the rulers that lies one of the central reasons for its difficult resolution.
SECTION 3.

THE ATTITUDES FACE IN CONFLICT

We then paid more attention to the perceptions, representations, and beliefs related to the conflict. The first step was to understand the imaginations at work in and behind the conflict.

PERCEPTIONS OF THE REBELLION

To do this, we asked the following questions:

1. For you, the rebels are mainly of which ethnic group?
2. For you the rebels are mainly of which religion?
3. Which situation correspond to the conflict: war, peace, etc.?
4. What do you think are the two main causes of the rebellion?

The answer to the question of the **ethnic or religious identities** of the rebels shows that, in general, the conflict is not imagined through the repertoires of ethnicity or religion. 57% of the population consider that the rebellion is not the result of a particular ethnic group and the Joólas are the only ethnic group mentioned but in relatively small proportions (14.4% of respondents).

It is true that in the early stages of the conflict, it had a multi-ethnic dimension, and the preparatory meetings at the stadium of Néma and in Diabir included the Joólas, Mandingoes, Peuls, Manjacks, and Mancagnes. In this sequence of the conflict, the narratives show that there was a division of the labour of the protest based on the comparative advantages of the different ethnicities present in Casamance. Because of their assignment to the military office, the Joólas have gained a prominent visibility: it is a Joólas, Sidy Badji who set up the armed
branch of the MFDC from 1984. But in general, it is from the meeting between the Joólas nationalist elite of the indigenous (gathered on the one hand around The Casa Sport; and on the other hand around the theories of Abbot Diamacoune) and the diaspora (from Esukolal, association of people from Casamance based in Paris led by Mamadou Nkrumah Sané and Mamadou Mauria Sadio), that came not only the independence claim, but also its ideological and symbolic leadership: all the leaders of the rebellion, political or military wings, are Joólas or affiliated members; all the cultural references mobilized are those of the Joólas world, even the language of the rebellion is the Joólas (Atika, Kelumak, Esukolal).

The army and the media will strengthen and harden this reality by making of each Joólas, therefore of all the Joólas, an active or potential rebel. This essentialization generates a reductionism that identifies the Joólas with Casamance, a vast multi-ethnic area yet, and the Joóla to the rebellion, which is obviously an outrageous simplification. Entire villages have risen up against the rebellion and individuals. Even in spite of the dangers and often at the cost of their lives, they have never failed to express their opposition to the demand for independence, and within Esukolal itself. Even better, the presence of the Joólas in the army in general and in the operations in Casamance is particularly important: there are Joólas on both sides of the conflict, on both sides of the belligerents.

Similarly, the respondents do not attach any particular religion to the rebellion. These results are all the more interesting because the first and highly publicized secretary general of the MFDC until his death in 2007, its main theorist, its spokesman was a man of the Church. Yet the conflict has never taken on a confessional coloration; the Church has taken great care to dissociate itself and to play a mediating role. Abbot Diamacoune’s referents, on the other hand, were more celebrating the authenticity of the Joólas and their ancestral virtues unknown to the “Senegalese” according to him. In the maquis, Christians, Muslims, and followers of the traditional religion mix, and as far as we know, the religious motive is never at the origin of internal divisions.

Chart 20. Religious identification of the rebellion
On the other hand, the religious and sacred traditional play an extremely important role in the course of the conflict. If we limit ourselves only to its symbolic functions, one of the recurring explanations of the longevity and insolubility of the conflict is based on the account of a pact that would have been forged at the beginning of the rebellion with a fetish specially established to bind the stakeholders to separatism: Diabir’s fetish would support war and punish any defection before the final victory as well as any betrayal.

Other similar pacts, the number of which is unknown, are said to have been made for similar reasons and/or to protect combatants, both by men and women. Therefore, no way out of the conflict would be possible until these pacts have been properly resolved, i.e. with insiders recognized to do so. The effectiveness of these beliefs among combatants and within the Joôla society helps to explain the traditional turning point in forms of conflict resolution.

As for the representations that the respondents have of the current situation in Casamance, for the majority (38.04%), it corresponds to a situation characterized by ambiguity: that of "no war no peace". This uncertainty – that of more than 51.35% of the population surveyed – which is manifested by the propensity to define in the negative "neither... nor" or "dnk" illustrates the complexity of a conflict about which it cannot be said to be active or over. This conflict, whose long phases of inactivity may make people believe that it is extinguished (31.89% think they are in a state of peace), nevertheless still experiences episodic eruptions.
and a state of exception (check points, significant presence of military, etc.) which make 8.45% describe the current situation as a state of war.

It is in the South, outside Ziguinchor, that we consider more that we are in a situation of war. The northern zone considers the situation more to be a state of peace.

The generational disintegration shows an important convergence in responses: all generations combined, the most shared feeling is that of "Neither war, nor peace". It should be noted that the third generation is the one that considers the most that the current situation is that of a war (12% against 6% for the first generation, and 7% for the second).

The gender disintegration this time shows a misalignment in positions: the prevailing opinion among women is that one is more in a state of peace while men are very clear in neither war nor peace.
It is this complex configuration, that of the status quo, of uncertainty and ambivalence, that researchers must decipher in its daily expression, its issues and its consequences. What lives, what relationships do we have with others and institutions when it is neither war nor peace?

ABOUT THE ORIGIN OF CONFLICT?

On the other hand, differences in perceptions are significant between the Northeast and the South when it comes to identifying the causes of the rebellion.

When asked to give two main causes of the MFDC’s entry into rebellion, the first response from the Northeast zone is “I don’t know” (37%), followed by the repression of independence demand (26.5%), and then the general sense of injustice (13%).

Respondents in the southern zone give priority to the repression of independence demand – which gets more than double the answers (58%) compared to the Northeast. While the exploitation and plundering of resources is the second main reason for the rebellion for the South, this justification appears only in the 7th position for the Northeast.

Similarly, the lack of consideration of State representatives is the fourth most cited cause in the South; this justification comes in the 6th place for respondents in the Northeast.

Land grabbing (9%) and the repression of the march of 26 December 1982 (7.5%) are moderately important reasons for the South; they are under-represented in the responses from the Northeast (3.5% and 0.7% respectively).

Conversely, cultural reasons that are quite minor in the outbreak of the conflict for southern respondents (10) are four times more cited by the inhabitants of the Northeast (43).
The analysis of the responses from Ziguinchor shows that three problems are identified in identical proportions as sources of the conflict:

- The lack of consideration of state officials,
- The armed repression of the independence demand,
- and the exploitation and plundering of local wealth.

Chart 28. The main causes of the rebellion according to the inhabitants of Ziguinchor

Beyond the significant discrepancy in representations on the origins of the maquis, it is worth noting a strong point of convergence: all areas combined, the first reason for the entry into rebellion is political, and is only very secondary economic and even more marginal culturally. The State's repression of the independence demand is for 43% of respondents at the origin of the radicalization of the movement which, at first, had not necessarily taken a violent option (see leaflet of the MFDC and the testimony of Sidy Badji, the founder of Atika). It appears that the State's inability to manage the differences has hastened most unarmed challenges to internal war by giving more substance and consistency to grievances. The same phenomenon has been observed for Boko Haram for example. The guerrillas came out not because of the objective and subjective reasons that are now well documented, but because the voices of people who said things about these objective and subjective elements were silenced, held in check, and repressed. The crystallization of the many grievances—including the ultra-minority separatist demand—for armed violence was not inevitable in the beginning, and was only a potentiality that came true, de facto eliminating other possibilities. The only thing that it has become so is because the conditions of genuine dialogue, namely to speak, to be listened to, to receive an answer, to continue the dispute without falling into physical violence have not been institutionalized. This is undoubtedly one of the hallmarks of the collapse of politics in Africa and in the contemporary world. The (re)discovery of the value of the word of others is therefore presented as a sign of exit from the catastrophe.

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20 Separatist leaflet distributed in Dakar and Casamance, December 1982: "[...] Things being what they are People of Casamance, take your responsibility. Immediately take control of your own destiny. But do it very democratically because you have the right to yourself. Do it without violence but with determination."

21 "The growing frustration with the status quo, especially among young people, appears to have strengthened Boko Haram’s insurgency. In this sense, more open debate and criticism of the Boko Haram doctrine rather than its removal could have helped" (Higazi, 2013).

22 See catalogue of the conflict (www.casamance-conflict.com) including: Oumar Diatta, René Capain Bassene, Marut, Foucher, Manga, Tavares, the Collective Gorée Institute...
It is probably necessary to say a few words about this repression, its nature, and above all its magnitude to understand the correlation thus established by the respondents. The repression actually began even before the march of 26 December 1982. As soon as the State heard about what was being prepared (from the Diabir meetings), a wave of arrests took place: Nkrumah Sané, Mamadou Mauria Sadio, and Abbot Diamacoune among other suspects were arrested on 20 and 23 December 1982 respectively. In retaliation for the five-year prison sentence of nine defendants, including the Abbot and Nkrumah, the tragic events of 18 December 1983 that marked the irreversible turn-down in the war took place. The repression therefore intensified.

"It is aimed at the rebels, but it is the entire population of Lower Casamance that is affected: each Joóla and assimilated is perceived by the security forces as a would-be rebel. There are hundreds of arrests. Far from being limited to the region, they affect the Casamance diaspora in Dakar, even in the entourage of the presidency. No one is safe, not even the leaders of the ruling party, suspected, wiretapped, arrested. The rebellion provides an alibi for private and political settling of scores: suspected of conspiring with the separatists, many activists or sympathizers of the PDS are thus arrested without evidence, on the basis of simple denunciation. These arrests make the bed of the MFDC [...]. In addition, there are police abuses against both civilians and combatants. These practices have existed since the beginning of the conflict, where humiliation and abuse of prisoners, especially women, are commonplace. [...] Instead of overcoming the rebellion, this repression only strengthens it, bringing new recruits and new motivations. Arrests, humiliations, tortures, disappearances are all reasons for revenge, whether by supporting the maquis or by joining it" (Marut, 2010: 116).

The widespread and disproportionate repression prompted fighters to stay in the forest where they hoped to hide while waiting for things to calm down. This is the true birth of the maquis and Atika.

Apart from the “dnk” and the non-answers in which they are ever more numerous, there is on this issue a rather impressive alignment of the responses of men and women: 45.50% of men and 40% of women put repression in the first response. In some responses, we have almost a doubling by men who seem more sensitive to the lack of consideration from the State representatives (16% for men versus 10% for women), to the feeling of general injustice (13.5% among men versus 9% among women), and place more emphasis on the cultural dimension of the claim (5% for men versus 2% for women).

23 There will be about ten of them, some of them arrested in Dakar.
But if we compare the responses of women to each other, there are very big differences: women in the North are the ones who answer massively that they do not know and who do not pronounce (53.5%). Women in Ziguinchor, on the other hand, have the lowest levels of ignorance and non-response (17 versus 43 for eastern women). The repression of independence demand, the exploitation and plundering of economic resources, and the lack of consideration are 51% of the main reasons for the conflict among women.

If we now compare men to each other, we realize that the same regularities as in women are observed. Here too the contrast is great in perceptions as to the origin of the conflict according to the geographical position. It is interesting to note that for the men of the South interviewed, the triptych of the rebellion is the lack of consideration, the exploitation of natural resources, and the repression of the demand for independence (a cause ranked first by men in the North).
The answers to this question allow us to highlight two important elements. First, the item "lack of consideration of the representatives of the State" records a great deal of attention among both men and women interviewed in Ziguinchor for which it is the first cause of the rebellion. This lack of consideration is expressed first in relations with a haughty and dismissive administration, which considers the populations of the South through the degrading clichés of colonization (backward, savage, animistic). This bureaucratic, physical, symbolic, and epistemic violence has profoundly destroyed citizens' relations with the State, its institutions, and its representatives. The distrust and distance thus created predispose to options in terms of dissent and exile and little loyalty to this "black Leviathan".

From this point of view, the analyses by the British sociologist Michael Mann can prove useful. Mann distinguishes two forms of state power, the "despotic" power of the elites of the State (or power over), and the second state power is called "infrastructure power" (or power of). These two dimensions combine in Mann's scheme, which allows him to distinguish what interests us here, namely bureaucratic, imperial or authoritarian forms (strong despotic power and weak infrastructure power). Applied to the situation in Casamance—and by extension to the Senegalese one—we see a strong State on the despotic dimension (particularly administrative elites have a lot of power over society), and low on its infrastructure (little public policies, and where they exist, they are inefficient); From there, a State with little legitimacy.

The second thing that becomes very clear is that the item "cultural and religious claims" is always the response of men and women who are located outside the Southern Zone and Ziguinchor in particular. No woman or man in this town gives this reason as the source of the conflict. These answers support the authors who consider the conflict to be eminently political: it mobilizes questions of recognition of sovereignty and economic justice. If we associate this question of the origins of the conflict with the answers to the question about

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24 The question that can be asked is whether since the emergence of the conflict, radical "behavioural" reforms of the administration and the state have been taken from an authoritarian bureaucratic state to a state more respectful of its citizens. Nothing is less certain...
the main claim of the MFDC (What is the main claim of the MFDC?), the overwhelming majority response is: 65% political independence, followed by greater economic and social justice. Again, the responses related to cultural recognition are almost nil.

Let us break down this response by zone: almost all respondents in Ziguinchor, 81%, answer "independence and autonomy", followed by "social justice" from afar. In this community, the items "request for cultural recognition" and "respect for traditional land law" receive no approval.

If everyone considers that the main demand of the fighters is independence, what is the legitimacy of independence according to the generations, the geographies, and the gender?

First of all, the levels of "I don't know" and people who do not speak are particularly high (35.6%) particularly in the East (52%) and the North (35.7%). Of the 64.4% who respond, 76% consider the claim to be illegitimate (49% of the overall group).
Those who consider the demand for independence to be "rather illegitimate" and "not at all legitimate" represent 60% of those surveyed in the North, compared with less than 5% who think otherwise. They are 42% versus 6% in the East, but the rates are much closer in the overall South (43% versus 24.5%). We need to take a careful view of the rather high rates in the South because just the fact of finding a claim legitimate does not mean that you are in favour of it. One can fully agree with women’s demands without being a feminist, that is, without adding elements of activism to intellectual adherence. One can indeed be in favour of an idea without yet approving its implementation.

In Ziguinchor in particular, 33% of respondents believe that the claim is legitimate (43% of men versus 21% of women). This is exactly the same proportion 32.3% who give an end to the independence request (32.5% of men against 32% of women). As we can see, in the epicentre, the population is very evenly divided but more women reject the demand for independence. It is better understood then that the struggle for peace is largely carried by women’s organizations.
These results question in part the analysis of many researchers who focus on the process of progressive disaffection that the conflict has caused in populations that were sympathetic to it in its early hours. The policy of balancing terror with the army – inducing the killings of those who were considered by the rebels as traitors or sometimes simply northerners –, the ignominious brutality, rape, robbery of civilians, war tax, forced censuses of maquis, threats of reprisals, theft of livestock, mining of villages, etc. All this violence and injustices have left a lasting mark on a widening gap between the rebellion and the populations they were supposed to liberate.

Do these figures obtained in Ziguinchor reflect this decline or, on the contrary, a revival of the demand for independence, in view of the latest events (mobilization against the zircon, the tragedy of Boffa, the assemblies of Salif Sadio etc.)? In the absence of comparison, it is very difficult to decide rigorously. However, the results of the generational analysis can be considered a size index. It shows that it is the third generation (the one that knows the least of the conflict) that has the highest levels of recognition of legitimacy (16.25% against 15.75% for the first generation and 14% for the second). Similarly, it is this generation that attributes the lowest rates of illegitimacy: 42.5% against 51.25% for the first generation and 53.5% for the second generation, i.e. more or less 10 points difference. For those who would be tempted to bet on the disappearance of the old separatist guard in order to hope that the conflict will die of "its beautiful death", there is certainly something to think about.
THE LOOK OF CITIZENS ON THE GEOPOLITICS OF THE CONFLICT

Perceptions about the geopolitics of the conflict have also been the focus of our attention. When asked whether the roles played by neighbouring countries (Gambia and Guinea-Bissau) and strategic countries such as France and the USA have been rather positive or rather negative, the following results are obtained.

Respondents answered with very high levels of ignorance and non-response: on average 58% did not know or answer this question. The role of neighbouring countries is less ignored on average (49%) than that of Western countries (nearly 67%). This can be understood by the regularity with which the media comment on relations with neighbouring countries. As for the ignorance of the role of countries such as France or the United States, it can be explained in particular by diplomatic reasons: after the army, diplomats are held to extreme discretion especially in matters of negotiations and international mediations. On the other hand, we know that the issue is important not only for France (former colonizing power) and the United States, but also for the majority of western chancelleries established in Dakar.

25 Important role of other Arab-Muslim countries including Morocco (Marut, 2010: p. 227 and ss).
In general, opinions are rather divided with regard to The Gambia and Guinea-Bissau in the war. The Gambia is considered by 29% of respondents to have had a very and rather negative role in the course of the conflict, compared to 20% for Guinea-Bissau. In both cases, this negative role resulted in support for the rebels (including sheltering and armament). But at the same time, The Gambia is deemed to play a more positive role than Guinea-Bissau in the course of the conflict and this support has taken the form of facilitating negotiations between the belligerents (the Banjul process 1 to 4). This ambivalence quite rightly reveals the state of relations between Senegal and its neighbours. All analysts have shown the fragility and ambiguity of these relationships. Guinea-Bissau is exemplary of this strategic volatility as a result of political changes, opposing and then approaching Dakar or a faction of the rebellion, depending on the circumstances. As much if not more than in Senegal, the issue of Casamance was central to the political life of that country as demonstrated by the civil war of 1998-1999 during which General Ansoumane Mané succeeded in coercing President Nino Vieira (supported militarily by Dakar) to exile thanks to the support of Salif Sadio's fighters. When Mané died, Guinea under Kumba Yala supported Salif Sadio's rival faction, which had become too burdensome, that of César Atoute Badiate, whom they armed and helped dislodge Salif Sadio from the South. The rapprochement with Dakar consolidates with the return of the President of Guinea-Bissau, Nino Viera as well as under the governments of his successors (Kumba Yalla, Malam Bacaye Sangna, José Mario Vaz).

Gambia under Yayah Jammeh has been for at least two decades the most problematic data in the State's policy in Casamance. The porous borders judiciously used by combatants as a withdrawal base, to which is added the extreme ambiguity of a relationship marked by mutual distrust (The Gambia accusing Senegal of welcoming dissidents and putschist candidates against the regime of Jammeh; and Senegal accusing The Gambia of supporting Salif Sadio, the most radical of the MFDC's military leaders), have largely diminished the possibilities for action for Senegal. It is easy to see why Dakar played a decisive role in Jammeh's departure. For the time being, the geopolitical part seems to be won by the Senegalese State: in the North as in the South of Casamance, Dakar coexists with allied regimes.

For 17% of respondents, France supports the State of Senegal, while the United States support more the negotiations for peace. But for both countries, Senegal's stability is a strategic issue.
in a volatile West African region – one of the most conflict-prone regions in the 1990s – and now subject to terrorist threats and large-scale transnational crime.

The relations between France and Senegal in the context of the conflict are dictated by pragmatism and issues that go beyond the issue of the separatism in Casamance. France cannot accept the destabilization of a reliable ally. This is why, although very discreet in mediation processes (if we exclude the Charpy Report and the aborted negotiations attempted by Ambassador Lewin), France remains central to the conflict. It is the financial guarantor of several agreements (accommodation of former rebels in Senegal or elsewhere, emoluments paid to some former rebel leaders, visas...).

The US is still in its discreet military surveillance and intelligence positions.
Since 1982, State intervention has taken many forms and has had different intensities. The conflict has indeed been governed through three presidents of the Republic and dozens of governments. From the axis ranging from brutal repression to international negotiation, to the public policies of opening up and development, cultural recognition, foreign policy, fragmentation of the MFDC, suppression of radicalization of the rebels, almost everything will have been tried for the fragile success that we know. The aim here was to measure citizens' perceptions of these various actions of the State and its military institution in particular.

Chart 41. The main intervention of the State of Senegal in the conflict

Once the majority of “dnk” and non-responses (38%) have been excluded, the sample surveyed considers that the main action of the State was to negotiate with the MFDC (27.30%). When the promotion of mediation is added, the dialogical approach becomes the majority response (39%). This is an interesting coincidence with the dominant features of Senegalese political culture – that of the Islamo-wolof model – which magnifies the virtues of dialogue and moderation, avoids the extreme positions and fitna (disorder, sedition) that they can generate. Even if these traits swear with the violence of repression in the 1980s and 1990s, the State seems to have quickly re-established its image, that of a country in medio virtus in which political elites are very often in the avoidance of physical confrontation. It earns it respectability and international positioning; at the same time, it prevents it from pouring into unacceptable excesses in order to fight the rebellion.26

26 The anti-model here being Nigeria in the face of Biafra’s separatism.
But it must also be said that in addition to the political imagination, the entanglement in a guerrilla war has forced the State to pragmatism: nothing is less certain than the certainty of winning the military part for good. Everything here plays against the army of Senegal, even highly professional, better equipped and experienced than the armed rebellion: the geography of a forest region, wet, interlaced with rivers, little known to non-natives, the proximity of two neighbouring countries that serve as a rear base and according to periods of allies to the rebels, etc. It is therefore easier to understand why the item "repression / confrontation" with the rebels is weakly cited as regular action of the State (14%). Negotiating with the rebellion is both politically skilful and militarily realistic.

The generational analysis allows us to observe globally convergent responses that first identify negotiation as the main intervention of the State. It has got a tremendous success among the first two generations. Indeed, when we count periods of conflict and respite, it appears that periods of lull are far more numerous. In addition to latent conflict and a pervasive military presence, intense clashes took place in 1983, 1990-91, 1998-2000, and 2009. Between 1990 and 2000, episodic attacks and clashes were recorded alternately on the southern or northern fronts. It is important to note that repression is mainly present in the responses of the third generation, the same generation who did not experience the most violent periods of the conflict. One of the "laws" of political science is verified here, living in an increasingly democratic and increasingly demanding society in terms of human rights, makes any excess of coercion unbearable.

Similarly, it is mainly the populations of Ziguinchor, Guinea-Bissau, and to a lesser extent Gambia who believe that there has been more repression on the part of the State of Senegal.
Even though they make it their main answer, the respondents do not know the results of this negotiation. More than half of respondents (52%) ignore that one or more peace agreements have been signed between the State of Senegal and the MFDC, and only 8% even believe that no agreement has been signed.
Yet there are at least three ceasefire agreements and three peace agreements:

1. Cacheu ceasefire agreement in Guinea-Bissau (31 May, 1991) between Sidy Badji and Médoune Fall, Minister of the Armed Forces of Senegal;
2. Ceasefire Agreement (8 July, 1993) through the mediation of the Clerical Committee;
3. Ceasefire Agreement (26 December, 1999) in Banjul, signed between the Senegalese government and the MFDC;
4. Banjul Agreements 1 to 4 (21-25 June, 1999; 03-05 Jan, 2001; June 2001; 6 August, 2001): MFDC Reunification Congress; meetings to adopt common positions against the State of Senegal and the MFDC’s internal headquarters;
5. Peace agreement (30 December, 2004) signed between Senegal's Minister of the Interior, Ousmane Ngom, and Diamacoune Senghor;
6. Foundiougne Agreements 1 (February 1, 2005).
Overall, opinions on the State intervention indicate a fairly balanced polarization of opinion: almost 51% of respondents consider that State action has been rather effective. On the other hand, those who believe that state action is not at all productive or rather unproductive are also very numerous (44%). Just under half of the population therefore has a negative appreciation of State action.

When we break down these data, they show that this polarization is very clearly geographical: it is those surveyed in the South who believe that State interventions have been marked by inefficiency (41% of those surveyed in Ziguinchor, 36% for the other Souths, and 16% in the Northeast) while more than half of the Northeast area recognizes a great or relative efficiency.
This has direct implications for the overall confidence that citizens have in the State's ability to find solutions to this crisis. 45% have no confidence and partly trust the State.
The people of Ziguinchor have only partial confidence in the State's ability to resolve the conflict: 53% against 38% for the other Souths, and 19% for the Northeast. Only 23% of them have full confidence in the State. What is more questionable is the fact that this population marked by distrust of the capacity of the State is composed of the youngest (under 30 years).

Chart 50. Confidence in the State of Senegal to resolve the conflict according to the region

ARMY-NATION OR THE ARMY AGAINST THE NATION?

At the heart of the State's intervention is the mobilization of the army, an institution that has played and continues to play a nodal role in the conflict. The military presence is very visible in Casamance. It is the only area of the country where military cantonments are encountered and where military convoys can be regularly encountered to the point of surprising the unsuspecting visitor. It is estimated that, depending on the period, one-third or half of the Senegalese army is deployed in Casamance. The military presence has helped secure much of the territory. The continued presence of the military and the effectiveness of their interventions are variously appreciated.

Chart 51. Role of the interventions of the Senegalese army
In general, few of those surveyed believe that the army's intervention in Casamance has helped to resolve the conflict (17%). According to them, however, as a primary function, this intervention had to contain the conflict (22%) regardless of the age or gender of the respondent. "Containing the conflict" means keeping it within precise spatial limits, avoiding its overflow\(^\text{27}\) and extension but also its aggravation. Indeed, the conflict zone has never passed the Lower and part of the Middle Casamance (the regions of Ziguinchor and Sedhiou).

"Containing the rebellion" within specific limits is therefore an extremely realistic and productive position. It does not allow to exhaust all military forces\(^\text{28}\), to keep the conflict silent and invisible, to protect the showcase of a country in peace and harmony. And the inability of the rebels to win the war against the army (no village was conquered and ruled by the maquis) would promote the negotiations:

"We really never had all the numbers there to give a club and crush the rebellion. This was never in the objectives that were assigned by the State and which were above all to ensure that the MFDC was neutralized and that the State could move towards negotiations." Colonel Wardini, spokesman for the Senegalese army quoted by Marut (2010: 161).

But above all, it allows time to do its work (wearing out, death, renunciation, suppression of radicalization of the rebels) and to obtain this peace without victory or defeat that President Macky Sall called for in 2019.

\(^\text{27}\) The overflows took place in Guinea-Bissau.

\(^\text{28}\) Senegal is indeed a major supplier of UN peacekeepers...
Even more problematic is the feeling of 24% of respondents that the intervention of the army would have been a factor in the aggravation of the conflict or would have maintained it. This view is mostly shared by those who live in the southern region. In Ziguinchor, 52% believe that the actions of the army have contributed to the worsening and sustaining of the conflict, compared to 9.5% for the people of the Northeast. The differences in perceptions here are extreme.

Those who think this way are mostly those of the second generation and are mostly men. It is good at this level to take into account the direct experience of these populations by questioning the specific actions of the army during the different periods of the conflict. The memory of the 1990s, during which:

« […] the military plunder, rape and kill with impunity, and privately acknowledge "having fun like crazy"[...] The reins was further let go in 1997, when the point of view of the "eradicators" prevailed in Dakar, allowing the army, according to one of its officials, to "let off steam" without the risk of being worried by political power. Repression is often blind: soldiers do not always distinguish between villagers and rebels whom they seek to eliminate by all means. The abuses of Senegalese security forces were denounced by human rights organizations as early as 1990. The charges come first from Amnesty International, which publishes numerous press releases and four reports on human rights violations in Casamance. They were subsequently taken over by the International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH) and by a Senegalese organization, the African Meeting for the Defence of Human Rights (RADDHO), […] Amnesty International's 1998 report severely implicates the Senegalese authorities: "The human rights violations in Casamance are mainly the work of the army and gendarmerie, which have been acting with impunity for years. […] Many of the interlocutors interviewed by Amnesty International stressed the deliberate will of the Senegalese security forces to keep the civilian population in Casamance in a situation of terror and to take revenge on them for the loss of life caused by the attacks by armed MFDC fighters." These include incarceration for their convictions. But it is above all disappearances, the use of torture, extrajudicial executions, that are denounced" (Marut).

This memory is still alive especially among the first two generations: 28.5% and 24.5% respectively consider the action of the army negatively (22% for the 3rd generation).
Hence probably the fact that the confidence in the army in its ability to resolve the conflict is even lower than that vis-à-vis the State. More than 45% of respondents have a partial and no confidence in the State and its army to resolve the conflict. Only one-third of respondents have full confidence in these two institutions. Everything suggests, regardless of the gender of the respondent, that those who do not trust the State do not trust its army for the definitive return of peace. Another striking fact is the finding that none of the residents Ziguinchor believe that the army fully respects human rights, compared to 28% for those living in Dakar, and 17% for those in Saint-Louis.
The above results can be interpreted, particularly for Ziguinchor and the South in general, as the differential between the values and principles that the State and its army display and their actual achievements. The State of Senegal officially presents itself as a constitutional state, concerned with respect for human rights, when, in Casamance, it trampled for years the basic freedoms of its own nationals. In fact, this State has been a police and authoritarian state in the South. As for the army, whose official credo is to be consubstantial to the Nation and thus to protect it, it has in fact, for years, participated in the course of the war to distinguish ethnically its targets and thus to treat a community in a discriminating way, precisely hindering the establishment of a national community. The lived experience of war actually creates two countries and two relationships with the State: that of populations that have been directly exposed to State violence and whose perceptions are made of defiance and distance, and that of those who have never been confronted with a State at war and who share a glorious imagination of the army (Blue Helmets, Jambars and Republican Army).

It must be said that since the changeover of political power between parties in 2000, the Army has learned from its mistakes and has completely changed its relations with the populations affected by the conflict: today, cases of abuses, disappearances or torture are no longer reported. On the contrary, committed to the reform of the FDS and the peacebuilding process, the Army emphasizes a goal of peacekeeping and collaboration with the people. The army wants to be close to the civilians: it helps the return of the populations, digs wells, organizes medical consultations, even coexists with the rebels...

Nevertheless, in the context of a dynamic of justice and reconciliation, this past would benefit from being emptied and the future with the Senegalese of the South built on new foundations.
SECTION 5.

CITIZEN APATHY AND CIVIL SOCIETY, THIS UNKNOWN

In a country known for its vibrant civil society and its anti-establishment youth, it is not surprising that 78% of respondents consider the role of citizens in resolving the conflict to be important. This is the highest score of unanimity obtained and we also have for this question the lowest levels of “dnk” and non-response.

This consensus crosses generations, gender, geography, and the countries. The centrality of the value-enhancing figure of the citizen and his active role in social transformations is strongly affirmed. It is interesting to see the levels of “dnk” and “na” have dropped significantly here, especially for the 3rd generation. This is the first time that it knows more than the 2nd generation and that it is equal to those who do not speak. It would seem that when it comes to issues related to citizen participation, young people, regardless of the area in question, are particularly demanding. Governing with this generation cannot therefore be a solitary and distant act, but an activity that is anchored in a dialogical and deliberative relationship.

Chart 58. Citizens' role in resolving conflict in Casamance

Chart 59. Citizens' role in the resolution of conflict by generation
Taken by zone, there is the same broad consensus around the role of the citizen. In Ziguinchor, more than 95% of the responses are dedicated to its importance. In the other Souths, we have 83%, and in the Northeast, we have more than 69%.

The responses of men and women here are exactly the same: almost 78% of women and 78.27% of men give an overwhelming majority to the role of citizens in resolving the conflict.

However, there is a major contradiction between the theoretical assertion of the role of the citizen and the practical exercise of the citizen. The zone analysis shows that only about 8% of the respondents in Dakar and Saint-Louis, 3.5% in Tambacounda, and 30% in Ziguinchor were actually engaged in the promotion of peace. More than ignorance, we have, even more massively, indifference and/or apathy.
Peacebuilding interventions had relied heavily on traditional mechanisms of conflict resolution and put women’s organizations at the heart of the scheme. It is surprising, however, that even in Ziguinchor, the city where most women’s peace organizations are based, the level of participation is particularly low (12% versus 28% for men). These rates fall to 3% for women in Dakar and Saint-Louis compared to 11% for men in these communities). This really raises the question of the evaluation of peace-building policies.
Chart 65. Women’s declared participation in regional peace action

Chart 66. Men’s declared participation in regional peace action

It is also those of the first generations (12% on average) who invest in these actions. The 3rd generation is at 5.68% in terms of participation in peace-related actions in Casamance. The most demanding in terms of citizen participation are the most apathetic when it comes to engagement on the ground. This is one of the paradoxes of democracy caught between the demand for ever-increasing rights and their under-mobilization on a daily basis.

Chart 67. Declared participation in action to promote peace in Casamance by generation

In the register of good news, it should be noted that 68% of respondents say they are ready to take part in an action to promote peace in Casamance: these figures speak how much people want a return to peace in Casamance. If given the opportunity, 46.5% of respondents in Dakar and Saint-Louis, 42.5% of those in Tambacounda, 35.5% in Ziguinchor are “absolutely ready” to participate in an action for peace in Casamance. These rates rise to 72%, 64%, and 65% respectively when added those who say "yes maybe". Women at 61% and men at 75%, the 1st generation at 61%, the 2nd at 75%, and the 3rd generation at 66%, say they are ready
to get involved to achieving this lasting peace. This is an interesting window of opportunity. The question is, how should this great motivation be mobilized to act for positively transformative purposes?

Chart 68. Commitment to participate in peace-promoting action in Casamance

Chart 69. Commitment to participate in peace-promoting action in Casamance by region

Chart 70. Commitment to participate in peace-promoting action in Casamance by gender
We have completed this series of questions with two questions about civil society organizations. CSOs often make calls for a definitive peace in Casamance. Various directories of actions are deployed for peace. The situation in Casamance has led to the swarming of civil society organizations in the region. Moreover, with this crisis, all NGOs have aspects that relate to the search or consolidation of peace, the care of the displaced or the improvement of the living conditions of the victims of the conflict (Goudiaby 2018). It turns out, however, that the vast majority of respondents do not know any of these civil society organizations that work mainly or secondarily around the return to peace in Casamance.

This "invisible action" of civil society actors is increased among those under 30 (74.46% of them). Those who know one or more structures of civil society are mostly those of the 2nd generation (for 42.08%) and the 1st generation (for 43.55%).

Men have a better understanding of the existence of civil society organizations than women. The people of Ziguinchor are more familiar with the existence of civil society organizations than other Senegalese citizens, and Senegalese citizens more than Gambians and Bissau-Guineans.

It will also be understandable why most respondents do not know whether the actions of civil society organizations are capable of helping to build lasting peace. Only 10.41% of all citizens think their actions are "very effective", and 15.34% consider them "rather effective". These are the Bissau-Guinean citizens (22%), Gambians (20%) who believe that their action is "very effective" whereas only 3% of Senegalese think so.
Chart 73. Effectiveness of civil society action for peace in Casamance

These findings urge to ponder over the visibility of the actions of civil society organizations. It seems that the latter are almost invisible both on the local territory and on the national scene.
In the last part of the questionnaire, we wanted to measure the moral expectations of respondents in order to draw the outlines of a governance of conflict coinciding with the values of citizens. The respondents take a critical position on the moral economy of the conflict and propose another management.

When asked: "What do you think is the main obstacle to peace in Casamance?", ethical reasons first (corruption of certain rebels by the State, drug money, and smuggling) and then political (division of the MFDC, weakness of its political wing, imbalance of power between belligerents, the game of mediators) are invoked. It is therefore both the actions of the State and those of the rebellion (drug money and smuggling) that are questioned. These three items constitute 33.5% of the responses.

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Chart 74. Key obstacles to peace in Casamance

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29 The formula is by Ousseynou Faye, 2015: 15
The division of the MFDC, which is the first reason identified at the tri-national level and in Ziguinchor, both by men and women, is a cross-cutting issue to politics and ethics. It is certainly due to internal positioning wars, but also to a political strategy of the State that has succeeded in making the crumbling of the rebellion its main Achilles’ tendon. Being more busy fighting, the various fronts almost lost sight of their goal of independence. This strategy, however, has undoubtedly led to an over-efficiency effort to make inter-MFDC dialogue impossible as factional resentments now seem insurmountable. The situation is therefore this: on the one hand, sectoral negotiations/mediations do not seem to be yielding the expected results and do not pacify the whole of Casamance. On the other hand, no possibility of agreement seems feasible between the various moderate groups that agree to negotiate with the State around federal or autonomist perspectives and ultra-radicals such as Salif Sadio and Nkrumah who still claim independence – but are in open conflict.

A second strategy that has backfired on the peace process in Casamance and is now one of its burdens, is the circulation of money through local and informal mediation. Since Diouf, peace-based brokerage has been a juicy industry, the object of fierce competition between actors whose aims are obscure: "Many people wonder what the involvement and the multitude of these peacemakers in the conflict hide: collective of deputies, collective of Casamance executives, coordination committee, coordination of non-governmental organizations, Committee of Wise Men, Gentlemen and Ladies of Casamance, etc." (Tavares 2015: 35). These brokers who manage to capture much of the peacebuilding rent have set up a predation economy that precisely needs conflict to thrive. The conflict market thus uses both traditional institutions and UN terminology. In doing so, they hijack and vitiate them, and at the same time cut themselves off from at least part of the rebels and the populations.
Finally, the conflict has literally been fuelled by the regional organized crime that sustains it. A true criminal economy based on the cultivation and trafficking of cannabis, wood, cashews, smuggling, and banditry has developed.

What is decried, therefore, is on the side of the State, a governance of peace built on a Machiavellianism, which, in order to contain the conflict, has divided, bought, discredited it. But what the political trick has achieved is a weakening but not an in-depth settlement. This opportunistic mode of governance, which refuses to confront the essential issues raised by separatism, put in place since the time of President Abdou Diouf and perpetuated to this day, certainly creates cracks in the rebellion but fails to overcome it. This form of governance generates crumbling and dispersal, but in this way ensures the rebirth and continuity of the movement. The current situation of "neither peace nor war" therefore reflects more this situation of trampling and stalling, of dead-end syndrome rather than of positive peace.
SECTION 7.

FOR A CITIZEN SCIENCES OF THE CONFLICT: NEW VOICES, NEW SOLUTIONS?

Finally, we wanted to know how citizens can contribute to the process of management of the conflict. Their voices, as we know, are rarely heard and in this case, the absence of a deliberative framework is obvious. However, the fact that citizens consider that another management of peace is possible, that short-sighted solutions are not inevitable, must be taken seriously.

Thus, putting them in the position of decision-maker, we asked them to choose two main actions, if they were in charge of the resolution of the conflict.

![Chart 76. Key actions that respondents would take to resolve the conflict](image)

The combination of "rebellion union" and "strengthening development policies" represent 38% of the responses. If we add the item that comes in third place "amnesty and reintegration of combatants", we get 52% of the answers. Independence receives no more than 3% of favourable responses, idem for autonomy. But what is significant here is that there is no real majority response. No item wins a quarter of the responses. This probably shows that citizens do not really know how to get out of the crisis either.

The latter advocate 22% of the union of the rebellion as a way out of the conflict where the State has accelerated its division. The withdrawal of the army does not seem to be desired, at least until a final peace has been reached; but at the same time, it is more an army tasked with peacebuilding and peacekeeping, in accordance with the rule of law, which seems to be sought since the intensification of repression, together with the cultural recognition, collect the lowest rates.
The analysis by zone shows that Ziguinchor strongly favours the economic response: 68% of respondents in the locality consider development policies to be the most appropriate response to get out of the conflict. This answer is a logical one because economic injustice was cited by the people of the South as the second cause of the conflict. Strengthening the State’s infrastructure is an asset for the search for peace. It must be said that interventions in this area are not insignificant: policies of opening up, health policy, and the establishment of a government agency specifically dedicated to the region: the National Agency for the Relaunch of Activities in Casamance (ANRAC).

We find very low rates in favour of independence: they are just 5% of respondents to promote independence, and 3% to autonomy. It is also very interesting to note that despite the very critical views towards the Army in this region, the withdrawal of the security forces does not seem to be desired, only 6% concerning this item. The distrust of the army therefore seems less related to its presence than to the form of its interventions.

The complementary solutions chosen are:
1. The identification of a consensual mediator;
These measures call for a "mix" of legal and political solutions related to transitional justice based on traditional techniques of justice and reconciliation. And certainly, the peace process will have to be multi-level to be effective: the micro level of intra-village relations, the meso level of inter-village and interactional relations, and the macro level of State-MFDC relations. Faced with such complexity, one of the traditional possibilities of picking up would be the establishment of a Dialogue, Justice, Reconciliation, and Peace Commission.

We went more deeply into this question and asked them more openly, if they were in charge of resolving the conflict in Casamance, what would be another possible action that they would prefer?

Sincere dialogue and negotiation have come back in force in the responses. Respondents emphasized the "honest" and "inclusive" nature of these discussions. Greater and more efficient administrative decentralization, demining of the entire region, disarmament and destruction of rebel bases, youth employment, education for peace and inclusive civil security, the erection of Ziguinchor as the second capital of Senegal, deliberations at the national assembly level are also proposed avenues.

Respondents also clearly favour African states and institutions in mediation and negotiation for peace in Casamance. Neighbouring countries (Gambia and Guinea-Bissau) are capping with an average score of 60%, which rises to almost 70% when added to those who say "yes perhaps". The community institution to be integrated as a priority is the ECOWAS according to the respondents, followed a little further by the African Union and the United Nations.
The case of France is specific because even if all the cumulative yeses give 53.25% of votes in favour of its involvement in the resolution of the conflict, it is also the country that gets the highest levels of rejection: more than 18% of respondents do not want France to be involved in the mediation. As for the United States, nearly 53% of respondents strongly or moderately support its presence to resolve the conflict.
What this study highlighted was the need:

- to strengthen the production of knowledge, in particular on the determinants of the failure of the peace agreements (an anthropology of the negotiations);

- to establish a forward-looking analysis of the different models of political dialogue to be initiated to emerge from the situation of "neither war nor peace" as well as the models of post-conflict reconstruction;

- to encourage and support civil society actors (young people and women's CSOs in particular) to play a more active and direct role in resolving the conflict;

- to support the construction of a memorial story that must be taken care of from a benevolent confrontation of the various narratives in circulation, towards a co-production of the public rehabilitation of the victims (Dialogue, Justice, Reconciliation and Peace Commission).
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