This is the third article in the CIHA blog series focusing on the Casamance conflict. It discusses the multilayered complications that marred peace negotiations in Casamance since the start of the conflict, owing to the disintegration of the MFDC, arms trafficking, instability, and political maneuvering by neighboring Guinea Bissau and Gambia, among others. Previous articles in the series were Factors that Influenced Casamance Separatism and The MFDC and the Nation State. Two more related publications, An Introduction to the Casamance Conflict: Implications for Peacebuilding and Feminist non-violent resistance in Casamance: AlañDi-So Bassène (1913 – 1940) are equally available on the blog in both English and French.
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Introduction
Nearly four decades after the repression of the march held on the 26th December 1982 that plunged Casamance into an unprecedented cycle of violence, the Southern region continues to alternate between clashes and negotiations. In fact, it was not until the early 1990s that the first official set of negotiations between the Senegalese State and the Casamance Movement of Democratic Forces (MFDC) were held. Although it is true that the initial talks have had the parties reach some agreements (the 1991-1992 ceasefire agreements) – made possible by the intervention of political and religious leaders, and the release of MFDC detainees – they were undermined by the fragmentation of the movement into factions, the radicalization of the separatist movement and the consolidation of MFDC as an armed group, arms trafficking, political instability in Gambia and Guinea-Bissau, etc. (Livre blanc pour une paix en Casamance, Août 2019).
As a result, sporadic violence continued to victimize, displace civilian populations, damage the region’s economy, and immobilized some 4,500 soldiers (Martin Evans, 2000). In other words, these agreements had offered only a short glimmer of hope before being repeatedly undermined by the attitude of the signatories themselves. Thus, the Casamance peace process seems to be caught in a dialectic of violation and recommencement.
It took almost a decade for the state to show the “will” to go to the negotiating table. From then on, President Abdou Diouf relied on the authorities in the region to bring the protagonists on the path of peace. This team was then designated as “Coordinator of peace initiatives in the Casamance.” It was headed by Deputy Marcel Bassène, assisted by Laye Diop Diatta, Moussa Diédhiou, and Omar Lamine Badji. In 1991, they succeeded in bringing the State of Senegal and the Northern Front of the MFDC to sign the first ceasefire agreement in Toubacouta, a locality located a few blocks away from the Gambian border. This was followed by that of Cacheu (Guinea-Bissau) on 31 May 1991. However, the terms of these agreements were short-lived.
This failure led to the creation of another team of mediators, led this time by generals Doudou Diop and Mamadou Niang, accompanied by Casamançais politicians Assane Seck and Robert Sagna. From the 21st to 25th June 1993, a series of negotiations, referred to as the “Banjul Talks,” was held, the objective of which was the “reunification” of the MFDC with a view to creating a more favorable framework for negotiations. On the 8th July of the same year, Abbé Diamacoune Senghor, Secretary-General of the MFDC, signed a ceasefire agreement in Ziguinchor, in the presence of the French mediator André Lewin. Six years later, in 1999, another was finalized between the parties in Banjul but this did not ultimately result in a ceasefire (IRN, 1999).
Image Source: AFP/Getty Images/Seyllou Diallo
Following on the footsteps of his predecessor, President Abdoulaye Wade set up a Peace Management Commission led by General Mamadou Niang who was assisted by Minister Youba Sambou. This led to the signing of their first peace agreement with a faction of the MFDC on March 16, 2001, paving a way for the adoption of the Amnesty Law of 21 July 2004. The management of the Casamance issue by Wade is also marked by the entry into play of the local traditional religious institutions and diola in particular, in this case Usoforal, Kabonketoor, the Usana, etc… “Thus, in October 2002, two thousand women of the Usana, women’s animist associations, marched in the streets of Ziguinchor to fight ‘mystically’ against the evil forces that had sunk the Joola and that prevented the return of peace in Casamance” (Vincent Foucher, 2003: 118). Later, on the 30th December 2004, another agreement was concluded between the then Minister of Interior and Abbé Diamacoune. In an effort to consolidate the gains already made, these were followed by the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding dubbed “Foundiougne I,” on the 26th and 27th February 2005 between the MFDC, the State, and civil society in Foundiougne. Mbaye Jacques Diop was then appointed to follow up on and consolidate the achievements of Foundiougne I and create the conditions for the Foundiougne II peace talks scheduled for the 27th and 29th December 2005. However, this meeting did not take place because of a request made by the Southern Front to postpone in order to better organize itself. This dragged on until Wade’s defeat in 2012. From all these experiences, the State has dithered and mismanaged the negotiations and made the signing of agreements its sole goal. This has led to a constant change in processing within the ranks of the MFDC leading to very poorly negotiated and consistently rejected compromises.
Ceasefires and peace agreements have not been in short supply in the Casamance case. But they have not been successful either. From the first one that was concluded in 1991 to that of 2004, every agreement was immediately sabotaged by the protagonists themselves.
1- Dakar’s Refusal to Discuss The Substantive Issue: The Independence Claim
Such a situation can be explained, on the one hand, by the fact that the negotiations have not, for the most part, undergone any serious preparations through a participatory as well as an inclusive approach. On the other hand, they seem to have been carried out with the sole aim of reaching an agreement, thus dodging substantive questions such as the status to be given to Casamance. The refusal on the part of Dakar to discuss the MFDC’s main demand – independence – has resulted in the negotiations being held around a great emptiness, which explains their short life span. “Looking closely for two decades, different approaches to conflict resolution have been implemented with an approach that excludes the political settlement of the conflict between the Casamance Movement of Democratic Forces (MFDC) and the State of Senegal” (Abdoulaye Diallo, 12 June 2012). To this, it must be added that there was a vacuum within the framework in which these talks were carried out because of the avoidance of issues deemed sensitive or dangerous. The avoidance of real issues on the part of the decision-makers and the executing State was one of the factors blocking a lasting peace in the Casamance.
2- The Fragmentation of the Rebellion
Another important factor in the failure of the ceasefire and peace agreements between the State of Senegal and the Casamançais protagonists is the implosion of the independence movement. Indeed, the break-up of the MFDC, resulting in several factions under different leaders, gave a new configuration to the conflict. The major consequence of this phenomenon is the discord of voices within the same movement. The long-standing internal divisions between the various factions of the MFDC, exacerbated by the demise in January 2007 of the historical head of the MFDC, Abbot Augustin Diamacoune Senghor, have opened the doors to a conflict of interest and physical confrontations between the heads of the various factions. These persistent differences date back to the 1990s. In 1991 for instance, the other factions rejected the ceasefire agreement reached by the state with the northern faction of the MFDC.
Undermined by its divisions, the MFDC now speaks with several voices. To this end, Christophe Châtelot wrote: “Caesar [Atoute Badiate] is at war with the Senegalese invader. He presents himself as the ‘Chief of the Staff of the MFDC.’ Two other rebels claim this title: Ousmane Niantang Diatta, also on the southern front, and Salif Sadio, the most active and the most radical of the three, fighting along the Gambian border, farther north” (Le Monde, 9 May 2012). It must be said that the death of Abbé Diamacoune Senghor reinforced the split of the MFDC, which currently has three rival armed branches and two secretaries-general fighting for political leadership, including Mamadou Nkrumah Sané, who has been in France for several years. This break-up does not facilitate peace negotiations as noted by Mario Giro, responsible for external relations of the Catholic community Sant’Egidio, who was involved in the mediations (Le Monde, Idem). This Catholic organization has been mandated since 2012 by part of the rebellion, namely the faction of Salif Sadio and accepted by the State of Senegal, and is currently the only mediator.
The rivalries between the various factional leaders in search of legitimacy led to a major consequence, the constant questioning of the peace efforts of one by the other. This has also reflected in the way the State has, since the beginning of this crisis, been choosing an interlocutor from among the ranks of the MFDC by way of trial and error: Kamoughe for Abdou Diouf, Ceasar Atoute Badiate for Abdoulaye Wade and Salif Sadio for Macky Sall (Pressafrik, 22 March 2014). These sudden changes in interlocutors with diverse and varied claims have made the framework of negotiations complex. It is clear from this discord that agreements signed by one faction are systematically rejected by others, hence the large number of agreements that were made without any real impact.
3- Money (from mediation and illicit trafficking)
The “peace market” that has developed around this issue has created total confusion, a plethora of actors, partial and closed negotiation circles, and multiple poles. We noted in fact the emergence of several leaders who, for various reasons, stimulate a process of negotiation with a part of the MFDC sometimes involving local or international NGOs and/or donors. According to Abdoulaye Diallo, those leaders, most of the time on the presidential mandate, often inject a lot of money in peripheral discussions with actors who are not decisive and whose role is sometimes even contested within the MFDC (civil and combat wing). Thus, the peace market has created “peace processes in the peace process,” which has dashed small hopes, set the players in a competitive dynamic, and deepened the divisions in the ranks of the rebellion.
As soon as he came to power in 2000, president Wade “believed he could buy peace with a bag of cash without addressing the substance of the problem,” says Nouha Cissé (Le Monde, 9 May 2012). The introduction of money will further complicate a situation that was already sufficiently complicated.
Moreover, the development of the war economy in the Casamance through the exploitation of resources and drug trafficking has also put a brake on the desire for peace among the parties and other actors who find their account in this situation of “neither peace nor war.” Indeed, Diallo believes that “the cross-border areas of Senegal are ‘no-go’ areas that promote the development of trafficking of all kinds, the most important of which are timber trafficking, livestock theft, arms, and drug trafficking.” It is also noted that the transformation of this space into a sugar factory for international and local non-governmental organizations is equally problematic. The gains made from this situation by the actors and neighboring States illustrate the resistance of several actors to achieving a definitive peace.
4- The Interference by Neighboring Countries
“The failure of the Senegalese government to resolve this conflict is due in part to the interference by Gambia and Guinea-Bissau, not as peacemakers but as active actors in the conflict” (Irene Nwamaka Osemeka, 2009). The double-sided game of the neighbors Guinea-Bissau and Gambia did not facilitate the return to lasting peace in Casamance. It is undeniable that these two countries contributed greatly to the peace efforts in the region and were at the same time key actors in the peace process, but their double-edged game also helped stall these same peace efforts. For example, Guinea-Bissau has been accused several times by the Senegalese government of harboring and supporting the MFDC both materially and financially (Jean-Claude Marut, 1996). Despite the instant rejections of these allegations, it seems irrefutable that since the early stages of its insurrection, the MFDC has functioned along the porous, wooded international border, increasingly on its southern side (Ferdinand de Jong, 1998).
In the course of this conflict, the State of Senegal was opposed to the State of Gambia during the reign of Yahya Jammeh. In fact, according to Hall, the Gambian President being a member of the Diola ethnicity, was several times suspected of having very close relations with the Northern Front, the faction that concluded the peace agreement with the government in 1992 and largely dominated by the Diola ethnic group. The war economy that has developed in the region has made relations between Senegal and its neighbors very complex. In the days following Yahya Jammeh’s statement to reassure President Wade during his visit to Banjul as he was returning from Bissau, that Gambia will not be a backward base for the rebels, a group of villages near the northern border of the Kolda region were looted by assailants probably from the Gambia (Walfadjiri, 2 May 2000).
5- The Religious Parameter: Pacts with Fetishes
Religion was also an important factor in the conflict in the Casamance, a lever on which both parties and actors in the peace process rely. The religious actors were then an important link in the dynamic of restoration of lasting and definitive peace in Casamance. Thus, the Church through her leaders and the Sant’Egidio community has been a significant actor in the peace process in Casamance. In addition, it should be noted the involvement of some notables and marabouts. However, the contradiction lies in the fact that the argument often put forward to explain the persistence of this crisis is that the return of a definitive peace is subject to the obligation to break the “pact” sealed between the remnants and the fetishes. The sacredness is both mentioned among the triggers or aggravating factors and was effectively mobilized as part of the process to put an end to the conflict. This seems to be reflected in the writings of Ba and Id Yassine (2020), who believe that “the traditional religious and sacred play an extremely important role in the unfolding of the conflict. If we limit ourselves only to its symbolic functions, one of the recurring explanations of the longevity and insolubility of the conflict is based on the account of a pact that would have been made at the beginning of the rebellion with a fetish specially implanted to link the parties to separatism: Diabir’s fetish would support the war and punish any defections before the final victory as well as any betrayal … Therefore, no way out of the conflict would be possible until these covenants have been properly settled, that is, with known insiders to do so.”
This account of a pact that would be sealed between separatists and supernatural forces is in any case very present in the analyses of researchers and observers of this conflict and the peace process. Proponents of this approach (Geschière and Van der Klei, 1987) believe that these traditional structures are both the sources and resources on which the separatists rely to fight.
The mystical pact between the MFDC fighters and the sacred wood of Diabir, an “offspring” of a Diabir fetish attributed to the separatists (Foucher 2005), would be the reason for the abortion of all the efforts made in the direction of restoring peace in the Casamance and the justification of the deployment and the promotion of women’s organizations (the Husana, Kabonketoor, Usoforal, etc.) which propose an approach inspired by traditional Diola worship. Indeed, there was a new player in the political scene in the late 1990s, supported by USAID, mobilizing traditional conflict resolution mechanisms to restore peace (Paul Diédhiou, 2015). However, despite the monopolization of the peace process in recent years by these women’s organizations, the negotiations in the Casamance remain an eternal circle. The religious thus becomes an important parameter in the analyses of the conflict and the peace process in the Casamance. The fetishes would then be an important lever to activate the hope for a definitive peace in the Casamance.
Conclusion
From President Abdou Diouf to Abdoulaye Wade, through to Macky Sall, the negotiations for peace in the Casamance have had different faces. However, despite different approaches to power and the various interlocutors of the MFDC, the results achieved were meager and had no great effect. Thus, all of the agreements, from the first to the last, signed between the government and the MFDC, have had a short lifespan, thus plunging the peace process into a situation of an eternal beginning. Even the numerous mediations have not yielded a solid result: “The last meeting took place in Rome from 9 to 11 July 2014, under the mediation of Sant’Egidio” (Ouestaf, 18 January 2018).
Authors:
Moise Diedhou, Ph.D. Candidate, Gaston Berger University, and CIHA Blog Editorial Assistant
Nyimasata Camara, Political Science Lecturer, University of the Gambia, and CIHA Blog Editorial Assistant
Mame Penda Ba, Professor of Political Science; Director, LASPAD, Gaston Berger University, and CIHA Blog Co-Editor
References
Abdoulaye Diallo, “Colloque: complexe ‘Sécurité et développement’,” organisé par le Secrétariat du Club du Sahel et de l’Afrique de l’Ouest (CSAO/OCDE) Paris, 12 juin 2012.
Ibrahima Mansaly, “Contribution: Processus de Paix en Casamance, un éternel recommencement,” PressAfrik, 22 mars 2014.
Irene Nwamaka Osemeka, “The Casamance peace process: 1947-2004,” PhD thesis, University of Lagos, December 2009.
Jean-Claude Marut, “La rebellion casamantaise peut-elle finir?,” Afrique contemporaine, Numero special 4e trimestre (1996), pp. 75-83.
Mame-Penda Bâ and Rachid Id Yassine, “Sortir de l’impasse du ‘ni paix ni guerre’ en Casamance: voix/voies citoyennes sénégalaises, gambiennes et bissau-guinéennes,” LASPAD, UGB, Le choix de WATHI, 27 août 2020.
Martin Evans, “Briefing: Senegal: Wade and the Casamance Dossier,” African Affairs, Vol. 99, No. 397 (Oct., 2000), Oxford University Press, pp. 649-658.
Ouestaf, “Crise casamançaise : médiations tous azimuts et accords de paix jamais respectés …. ,” 18 janvier 2018.
Viencent Foucher, “Pas d’alternance en Casamance? Le nouveau pouvoir sénégalais face à la revendication séparatiste casamançaise,” Politique africaine 2003/3 n° 91, Karthala, pp 101-119.